CONSTITUTIONAL RISKS TO EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Historically, the Supreme Court has required a showing of particularized harm to prove an equal protection violation. For example, in McCleskey v. Kemp,' the Supreme Court found no equal protection violation 2 despite statistical studies showing that defendants charged with killing white victims were four times more likely to be sentenced to death than those charged with killing black victims. 3 The Court reasoned that these statistics did not demonstrate that racial considerations had played a role in McCleskey's particular sentence. 4 Although the requirement of particularized harm is consistent with the traditional common law view of causation, it necessarily causes courts to neglect more subtle, systemic risks created by the operation of government. Often a criminal defendant cannot identify a specific wrongdoer, nor can he prove that racial discrimination more likely than not tainted his particular conviction.5 Sometimes, as in McCleskey, all that a defendant can show is that, after multipleregression analyses have accounted for plausible non-racial explanations, disparities still remain.
The requirement of particularized harm is of special concern in equal protection cases today as social mores have largely driven racial animus underground, making discrimination far more likely to occur surreptitiously. 6 This problem is exacerbated in the criminal justice context, in which government actors often wield vast amounts of discretion -discretion that allows those who discriminate to mask their
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I. THE PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT
Equal protection doctrine generally requires both a particularized actor and a particularized harm: a litigant must prove not only that a government actor was motivated by a discriminatory purpose,' 1 but also that the discriminatory act affected the outcome of his case.' 2 The Court has adhered rigidly to these particularity requirements, inducing some commentators to describe the doctrine as limiting equal protection violations only to cases in which a government official is "out to get" an individual based on impermissible grounds.' 3 Except in a few select areas, 14 statistical evidence rarely furnishes a basis for a successful equal protection claim.' 5
A. The Reasons for Particularity
The reluctance of courts to grant relief based on statistical showings of inexplicable racial disparities is not without reasonable basis. The requirement of particularity is closely linked to traditional Enlightenment notions of moral responsibility and free will, and a rush to embrace statistical data could significantly compromise these widely held values. In addition, statistical analyses can be plagued with subtle technical flaws that are difficult to detect. When courts face these concerns as well as the problems of remedy discussed in Part II they are understandably hesitant.
i. Moral Responsibility and Free Will. -The requirement of particularity is not surprising in light of common law causation principles, Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 24-25 (x971) (school desegregation); see also Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1119-34 (1989) (arguing that in jury selection, voting, and education cases, the intent requirement is significantly attenuated). 15 The Supreme Court typically accepts statistical evidence only when a law's application is so racially disparate that the numbers permit the inference of discriminatory intent. For example, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (196o), the Court found unconstitutional a twenty-eight-sided voting district that redistricted all but four or five of 400 black voters, but no white voters. Id. at 341; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (x886) (finding an equal protection violation when city supervisors denied permits to two hundred Chinese laundries while granting permits to eighty non-Chinese laundries). which are binary or mechanistic, 1 6 rather than probabilistic. 7 These principles arise from a Newtonian perspective -every action arises through the will of a free moral actor' 8 -and accord with traditional notions of moral responsibility in the law' 9 and the structure of private law litigation. 20 Thus, just as tort law requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant more likely than not caused his injury, constitutional law requires a party to show that a government actor's racial animus more likely than not changed the outcome of the case. This understanding of causation creates particularity requirements along two closely related veins: First, the law seeks to blame a specific actor, not societal conditions or the system in general. Second, the law requires that the actor have actually harmed the particular defendant.
The requirement of a particularized wrongdoer manifests itself in the equal protection requirement of purposeful discrimination and in the rejection of statistical proof of harm when a claimant cannot identify a specific wrongdoer. 21 For example, in McCleskey the Court cited jury uniqueness in denying McCleskey's claim. 22 Because the jury acted only once, no consistent pattern of racism could be imputed to
it.23
From the standpoint of individual responsibility, this conclusion makes logical sense -a single point, per se, cannot form a pattern. The systemic result, however, is that discriminatory decisionmakers go undetected, and structural safeguards that could prevent or impede racist decisionmaking are not considered.
The focus on actual harm to the particular defendant bars recovery when statistical studies can demonstrate only a risk of discrimination, not actual discrimination. 24 This doctrinal rule has normative and practical support. Normatively, denying recovery in the absence of ac-tual harm forgives transgressions in which no evil results 25 -"no harm, no foul." Practically, compensating every risk that government action imposes would involve enormous transaction costs and measurement difficulties and might well lead to an excessive level of rights enforcement and an overly cautious society. 26 Every government action theoretically harbors some risk of discrimination; to compensate for all such risks would be unmanageable, if not impossible. 7 The response to these arguments is two-fold. First, it is possible to distinguish between individual actors and the government. Forgiveness is less normatively appealing when applied to the government, especially because racial discrimination seriously undermines the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Second, the practical difficulties of compensating all risks do not require courts to compensate no risks. By compensating some subset of "substantial" risks delineated as a matter of policy, the law can avoid the slippery slope. 29 One of the most significant criticisms of statistical studies on discrimination is the inability of multiple regressions to account for all race-neutral explanations for racial disparities. Statistically, some crimes or behaviors may be more prevalent among members of certain minority groups; thus statistics showing disproportionate sentencing, prosecution, or policing may not reflect any discrimination at all. 30 Although regressions account for many raceneutral explanations and are thus more sophisticated than the raw numerical comparisons featured in disparate impact arguments, 3 1 re- 25 See Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 882-83. 26 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 76-77 (1974). 27 These concerns probably underlie the well accepted tort doctrine that one cannot recover for "negligence in the air" (a negligent act that results in no injury). See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., x62 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.). See generally HORWITZ, supra note z6, at 56 (discussing the "negligence in the air" doctrine). Similarly, the infeasibility of awarding reversal for any de minimis trial mistake probably underlies the harmless error doctrine. 28 See infra note 79. For a discussion of slippery slopes and the problem of line drawing, see Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985) . 29 The methods by which judges and juries handle statistical and probabilistic evidence would obviously be critical to the successful implementation of a constitutional risk perspective. A general discourse on these issues, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of the advantages of statistical data over experts ' This concern may be valid, but surely parties must do more than speculate about possible flaws to invalidate statistical evidence. The key question is whether the omission of potentially explanatory factors creates sufficient doubt in a study's accuracy to warrant the denial of all relief. Although the omission of variables may affect the probative value of a regression, it should not always render a study entirely inadmissible as evidence of discrimination. 34 As some statisticians suggest, courts need to consider just how significant a permissible "unknown" factor would have to be to account for the racial disparities observed.
3 s For example, although there may be a five to one racial disparity in traffic stops, it is improbable that blacks are five times more likely to speed or to drive with a broken tail light than whites. The other major problem with using statistical data in the equal protection context is the question of class definition: how one defines one's statistical sample can affect the results of a study. For example, there may be a racial disparity among murder sentences throughout a state, yet there may be no such disparity in a particular county. Courts do, however, face similar problems in mass-tort class actions as tions in sentencing, since it is able to control for permissible factors that may explain an apparently arbitrary pattern."). 32 See Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 627-33 (x998) (discussing a method to account for correlations between non-racial factors and race and suggesting that collecting data on nonprosecutions is notoriously difficult).
33 E.g., Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470 (citing a lack of evidence regarding "similarly situated persons" of other races); McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295 n.14 (distinguishing death penalty cases in which there is "no common standard by which to evaluate all defendants" from jury venire selection cases in which the number of factors is purportedly limited and, "to a great degree, objectively verifiable"); Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d 56o, 562 (Ga. 1995) (finding statistical evidence insufficient and criticizing the potential omission of other race-neutral explanatory factors). 34 
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B. Costs
As already noted, the particularity requirement and its rejection of statistical evidence have substantial costs. The Court's cramped view of constitutional harm forces courts to examine only individual cases, which cannot reveal or redress patterns of racial discrimination.
38
Considered in isolation, nearly all decisions can be rationalized using permissible explanations; it is only when these decisions are considered in the aggregate that patterns may emerge that indicate the presence of impermissible discrimination. 3 9 As a result, the particularity requirement obscures the discriminatory decisions of government actors, making their already broad discretion effectively unreviewable.
It is true that overt discrimination is readily detectable under the traditional particularized harm framework. If a judge overtly relies on race in sentencing defendants to death, or if police departments target motorists because of their race, the discrimination is plain. But the particularized framework, though perhaps effective in past "conquests" 40 of overt discrimination, is wholly inadequate in a contemporary society in which "discrimination takes a form more subtle than before." 4 1 Contemporary mores and legal pressures have altered the appearance of racism. Gone are facially discriminatory statutes and prosecution policies. In their place has arisen a racism cloaked in nonracial explanations. 4 2 Thus, despite a facially neutral statute and the absence of an overtly discriminatory enforcement policy, regression 37 See, e.g., Md. Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1077-78 ( 4 th Cir. 1993) (defining the class in a Title VII disparate impact action as the available pool of workers).
38 Cf Garner v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1372 & n.i (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that, in the ex post facto context, a court must examine the effect of a rule change on the class of defendants rather than on the particular defendant because the combination of rules and discretion involved in sentencing precludes ever proving harm in the individual case); JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 44 (1987) (suggesting that, in the scientific context, looking analytically at individual pieces reveals little about global interactions or changes); Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 885 n.141 (suggesting that, in the tort context, case-by-case adjudication often overlooks aggregate or systemic problems).
39 Cf. Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, z98z Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 39 (I982) (noting that "statistics on employment decisions that by themselves appear neutral or nonprobative may take on a different meaning when seen in the context of the company's overall employment activities"). 40 Kennedy, supra note io, at 1419. 41 Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559 (1979); id. ("But [the discrimination] is not less real or pernicious."); see Kennedy, supra note io, at 1419 (discussing how the purposeful discrimination requirement "ignores the chameleonlike ability of prejudice to adapt unobtrusively to new surroundings").
42 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2o, at 159o (2d ed. 1988) (observing that finding a "bigoted decision-maker" can be difficult). analysis may still show that, even after accounting for all relevant nonracial factors, minorities are more likely to be arrested, convicted, or sentenced more harshly. The particularity requirement, however, renders courts incapable of recognizing such risk-based harm.
The broad discretion traditionally afforded government actors in investigating, prosecuting, convicting, and sentencing defendants exacerbates the cloaking phenomenon. 43 Although some discretion is inevitable because of the resource allocation and complex balancing questions involved, 44 broad discretion facilitates the masking of impermissible motives. Together with the judicial deference that usually accompanies it, such discretion fosters an environment acutely susceptible to discrimination. 45 Moreover, the failure to recognize statistical evidence and constitutional risks of discrimination legitimizes government structures and practices and thereby inhibits not only courts, but also legislatures from examining them. 46 By denying the existence of discrimination altogether, courts absolve other "governmental and nongovernmental actors of responsibility for solving these problems" through alternative avenues. 47 The inability to remedy a harm does not justify the refusal to acknowledge its existence.
4 8 Finally, because requiring particularized harm will almost always result in a finding of nondiscrimination, courts can theoretically manipulate the required level of particularity to mask ideological preferences for or against greater equal protection.
49 43 See, e.g., James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1521, 15211-22 (x98s) (discussing how prosecutors have gained discretion while other actors such as magistrates, parole boards, and correctional officials have been constrained); infra note 1u5. 44 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (i985) (suggesting that prosecutorial discretion is necessary because of resource limitations and because of the "systemic costs" of judicial supervision, which include chilling law enforcement by scrutinizing prosecutorial motives and undermining prosecutorial effectiveness by "revealing the Government's enforcement policy"). 45 See infra note Iio. 46 See Kennedy, supra note io, at I46. 47 Tribe, supra note 8, at 34; see id. at 33-34 (criticizing McCleskey on this ground); cf id. at 30 (arguing that, in a school desegregation case, even if the Court "would have had no impact on judicial remedies, a judicial proclamation that inner city ghettoization was constitutionally infirm might have avoided legitimating this nationwide travesty'). 48 See id. at 38 (explaining that modernism teaches that "we can see more than we can do," but that "this does not mean that we should lie about what we see"). 49 Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 767 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of manipulating standing to disguise a decision on the merits); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 428-35 (1999) (describing the use of deterrence-based arguments as a rhetorical strategy to pacify debates and to mask ideological preferences).
This observation does not mean that courts regularly use doctrinal manipulations to achieve desired substantive outcomes, but the threat that courts might do so nonetheless exists. For example, a skeptical observer of ex post facto doctrine could suggest that the Court has manipulated the required level of particularity to make relief more difficult to obtain: when particularized harm is easier to prove, the Court requires general systemic harm; when general systemic harm is 
C. Effects
A brief survey of equal protection doctrine in sentencing, prosecution, and policing evinces the pervasive culture of particularity and its consequences. Courts have generally declined to award relief on the basis of statistical racial disparities, focusing instead on the particular facts of each case.
z. Sentencing. -Despite various studies showing racial disparities in sentencing, 0 the bottom line is simple: no court has ever found an equal protection violation on the basis of racial disparities." 1 Although the reasons for this stark result are complex, the principal decisions leave little doubt that the particularity requirement has played a critical role. For example, in McCleskey, although the Court assumed the validity of the statistical studies arguendo 2 -thus allowing the discussion to venture beyond surface-level empirical debates -it still denied relief, focusing on the particulars of McCleskey's case. According to the Court, McCleskey could not claim discrimination because he was indeed guilty as charged -he had "committed an act for which the United States Constitution and Georgia laws permit imposition of the death penalty."
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the corollary of the purposeful discrimination requirement of Washington easier to prove, the Court requires particularized harm. Compare Seling v. Young, 121 S. Ct. 727, 734-35 (2oox) (requiring that "punitiveness" for ex post facto purposes be determined faciallythat is, systemically -and finding that the defendant's particularized showing was insufficient), with Garner v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1370 (2000) (requiring a claimant to "show that as applied to his own sentence the law created a significant risk of increasing his punishment"). s1 See Kennedy, supra note io, at 1402 ("[A]s far as reported cases disclose, no defendant in state or federal court has ever successfully challenged his punishment on grounds of racial discrimination in sentencing." (emphasis omitted)).
S2 McCleskey v. Kemp, 482 U.S. 279, 292 n.7 (1987). The empirical validity of racial disparities in sentencing has been a matter of ongoing controversy, but suspicions of racial discrimination in capital sentencing are not new. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (2972), several Justices, including the dissenting Chief Justice Burger, all expressed concerns about racial discrimination in capital cases. See id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring) (blaming standardless statutes for the discriminatory imposition of the death penalty); id. at 3io (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[I]f any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race."); id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that, "while the higher rate of execution among [blacks] is partially due to a higher rate of crime, there is evidence of discrimination"); id. at 389 n.I 2 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (acknowledging disparities). v. Davis 5 4 was that "a criminal defendant must prove that the purposeful discrimination 'had a discriminatory effect' on him." 5 McCleskey had "offer[ed] no evidence specific to his own case that would support an inference that racial considerations played a part in his sentence," ' 6 and thus was not entitled to relief.
The McCleskey Court thus manifested a legal consciousness narrowly focused on particular acts. The statistical studies showing racial disparities in sentencing were discarded as irrelevant to the individualized determination of justice. 17 Even more telling was the Court's revealing statement in a footnote that "[e]ven a sophisticated multipleregression analysis ... can only demonstrate a risk that the factor of race entered into some capital sentencing decisions and a necessarily lesser risk that race entered into any particular sentencing decision." 58 In other words, the risk of racial discrimination, in and of itself, was simply not enough.
Defendants claiming racial disparities in noncapital sentencing have fared no better. 5 9 After all, if the gravity of capital punishment 54 426 U.S. 229 63 Indeed, defendants have rarely succeeded in making any selective prosecution claim at all. 64 In denying relief, courts have focused less on a particular defendant's acts (as in the sentencing context) and more on the defendant's inability to show that prosecutors purposefully caused the racial disparities. 6 Only when the statistical disparities have been outrageous enough to make purposeful discrimination a virtual certainty have courts granted relief.
For example, in the only recent Supreme Court case dealing with alleged racially discriminatory prosecution, United States v. Armstrong, 66 the defendant argued that black crack-cocaine offenders were accounts for possible race-neutral factors, while the other inquiry focuses on a disparate impact argument that disregards whether race may be merely correlated with a particular race-neutral trait (for example, crack cocaine use Statistics revealed that every one of the twenty-four federal crack cocaine cases tried by the local federal defenders office involved black defendants, and affidavits suggested that white offenders had been tried only in state court, in which penalties were considerably lighter. 68 Based on this evidence, the district court granted the defendant discovery of the prosecution's records. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence failed to show that "similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted," 69 and thus that the evidence was insufficient to warrant discovery. to obtain an injunction against a discriminatory police practice, a plaintiff must show a high likelihood that he in particular will be injured again. 7 6 Thus, the particularity requirement once again presents a sizeable obstacle to relief for targeted groups. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RISK AND THE REMEDY PROBLEM
The shortcomings of the traditional particularized harm requirement can be ameliorated by a greater focus on and acknowledgment of constitutional risks. Drawing from the mass tort context, this shift can be achieved in two ways: Rather than viewing risk as an irremediable possibility of harm, one can view risk as a remediable harm in itself. 77 Or, one may presume that, given a large enough population, what is traditionally "only" a risk is statistically certain to materialize into an "actual" harm: 78 yet because the actual manifestation of harm may be difficult to locate, one may prefer to empower third parties or private attorneys general for enforcement purposes.
These alternatives are essentially two sides of the same coin, but this Note pursues only the first. 7 9 Seeing risk as a remediable harm in itself fits well with the current individualistic conception of causation. In addition, by characterizing risk as injury in fact, one can address constitutional risks while avoiding doctrinal standing obstacles. 79 By conceiving of risks as harms, the law must, as a practical matter, deal only with "substantial" risks to prevent an explosion of claims. See Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 476 (suggesting that courts may need to limit recovery to "significant" risks). The line between "de minimis" risks and "substantial" risks is drawn as a matter of policy, just like the one delimiting "proximate" cause. 81 On a theoretical level, the systemic and aggregative approach of a constitutional risk perspective may also be more consistent with equal protection than is the particularity approach. Although the battle against racism has perhaps traditionally had a more individualistic tone, emphasizing each person as an individual and not as a stereotype, the concept of equal protection itself invites comparisons on a systemwide basis. It invites comparisons among sentences, prosecutions, and traffic stops. It invites an examination of whether justice is equally distributed. 
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crimination. At a minimum, a constitutional risk perspective would ensure that courts recognize the problem of discrimination in the criminal justice system. 8 2 Even if an effective court-imposed remedy were unavailable, acceptance of statistical evidence in the courts would impress the problem of discrimination on both government actors and the public at large.
Ideally, however, constitutional rights should be enforceable by adequate remedies. 8 3 Thus, the principal difficulty with achieving judicial acceptance of the constitutional risk perspective will be finding effective but appropriately cabined remedies.
8 4 As the remainder of this Part demonstrates, the traditional remedy for constitutional violations (reversal or dismissal) seems ill suited to address constitutional risks, as does the more activist remedy of a structural injunction. The solution rests instead with tweaking the equal protection right itself to create a requirement of procedural safeguards.
A. Sanctions r. Dismissal -Dismissal or reversal 8 has ordinarily been the remedy used to redress constitutional violations in the criminal process. 8 6 A substantial problem with dismissal remedies, however, is the oft-heard complaint that they are windfalls to defendants. 8 7 Defendants are freed not because they are innocent, but rather because of some problem in the criminal system itself. For this reason, although equal protection challenges in the criminal law context are perhaps more in need of redress for reasons of legitimacy and justice, they are more difficult to vindicate than those in other contexts. Unlike in other contexts, in which claimants are at least occasionally sympathetic, in the criminal context the claimant is nearly always a con-82 Acknowledging constitutional risks will invariably require greater use and acceptance of statistics, and therefore courts may have to develop greater familiarity with and expertise in this area. As in other fields, however, the use of statistics and probability should be unremarkable. In the natural sciences, scientists often resort to statistics and probability to describe the physical world when a system becomes too complex to model using cause and effect relationships. Described by some as a "mathematical theory of ignorance," when one cannot follow the behavior of every particle or actor in a system, science settles for describing it holistically through the use of 84 See Karlan, supra note 71, at 2029 (suggesting that the problems regarding equal protection and the criminal justice system are "as much about remedies as about rights").
85
Reversal remedies, however, are inappropriate for constitutional risks because the harm involved is systemic and therefore will persist even in a retrial. Some might argue that the importance of vindicating equal protection rights in the criminal justice system justifies the social costs of releasing or retrying guilty defendants. Because defendants have the greatest incentive to monitor the system, they are needed as private attorneys general to deter state actors from unconstitutional behavior.
9
Nevertheless, the suitability of a private-attorney-general system in the constitutional risk context does not necessarily follow from its acceptance in the traditional context of proven, particularized discrimination. The right-remedy gap is even more pronounced when the harms suffered are constitutional risks -traditional harms discounted by probability. If dismissal for racially motivated prosecution of an otherwise guilty bank robber is already disproportionate, then dismissal when there was only a risk of racially motivated prosecution is even more problematic.
Constitutional risk presents an even more serious problem for dismissal remedies. Unlike the traditional particularized harm regime, a constitutional risk regime cannot limit dismissal to a small class of defendants. Because constitutional risk acknowledges a systemic problem, it would make dismissals available to all future defendants, calling into question the entire criminal justice system. 9 0 This kind of wide-ranging reductio argument weighed heavily in McCleskeyY 1 2. Rebuttable Presumptions. -One solution to the dismissal problem would be to allow constitutional risks to create a rebuttable presumption of constitutional infirmity. 92 When a defendant demon- strates an otherwise inexplicable racial disparity, a constitutional violation would be presumed unless the government could produce a neutral explanation for its behavior. Such presumptions have often been used in the jury selection and school segregation contexts. 93 Critics may argue, however, that such rebuttable presumptions create costly burdens on law enforcement and prosecutors given their limited resources, especially if the collection of statistical and other data justifying racial disparities is costly and difficult.
In addition, a rebuttable presumption still presupposes the existence of a particularized wrongdoer who can provide a race-neutral explanation. In the criminal justice system, such explanations are often unavailable. For example, jury deliberations are strictly confidential, making an allegation of racial discrimination impossible to rebut. In these instances, the rebuttable presumption would be no different than dismissal.
On the flip side, small sample sizes make race-neutral explanations impossible to refute. Even if juries had open deliberations, they still convict and sentence only once, and individual prosecutors try few cases with similar factual situations. In such circumstances, these actors can easily rationalize potentially discriminatory conduct by giving race-neutral explanations. 9 4 Rebuttable presumptions would therefore fail to remedy the constitutional risk.
3. Discovery. -Another alternative would be to grant discovery requests by defendants who raise plausible statistical claims, but to leave the burden of proof on them. "[M]ost of the relevant proof in selective prosecution cases will normally be in the Government's hands," 95 so discovery will provide additional data for defendants seeking to satisfy the traditional requirement of discriminatory purpose. Armstrong, of course, rejected precisely this discovery remedy, 96 but that decision arguably rested on the Court's particularized view of harm: because Armstrong had proven no harm in his particular case, ( he was not entitled to discovery. Were the Court to recognize constitutional risk as an actual harm, one could imagine the Court being more inclined to grant a discovery "sanction." 9 7 Although granting discovery on the basis of constitutional risk would be an improvement over the present Armstrong doctrine, discovery too suffers from reliance on particularized wrongdoers. Discovery is only useful to defendants if the information discovered can prove intent, but short of finding the proverbial "smoking gun," discovery will likely provide only more statistical data, and little will be gained. And as precedent suggests, only in extreme cases will courts infer intent solely from statistical disparities. 98 4. Proportional Remedies. -Within the realm of compensatory remedies, constitutional risk faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it is unclear what remedy other than dismissal or a sentence reduction would provide sufficient incentive for a defendant "to ferret out racial discrimination." 99 On the other hand, dismissal is an overly generous remedy for constitutional risk. Constitutional risk varies by degreesthe harm inflicted depends on the magnitude of the risk. Dismissal, however, is a binary remedy -either a defendant escapes conviction or he does not. Dismissal is thus a windfall because it cannot be discounted to fit varying levels of harm.
This mismatch between harm and remedy exists at most stages of the criminal process: decisions to prosecute, convict, or sentence to death are all binary. But at some stages, such as noncapital sentencing, differences of degree do exist, theoretically allowing courts to discount for uncertainty. As in the tort context, courts could discount what would otherwise be full compensation by awarding proportional remedies. 100 More specifically, if a statistical study (having sufficiently accounted for all nonracial explanatory factors) were to demonstrate 97 Cf. McAdams, supra note 32, at 658 (arguing that discovery is a useful sanction because it is costly to prosecutors and is an intermediate remedy); Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. o7i, xogo-98 (1997) (arguing for discovery as a form of "soft enforcement"). However, although discovery may impose costs on government actors and deter unconstitutional conduct, it is not a "true" sanction. Unless a reasonable opportunity for ultimate dismissal accompanies discovery, defendants will lack the adequate incentives to bring claims. 98 See supra note S. 99 Karlan, supra note 71, at 2028. Civil damages, the common law remedy for rights violations, seem unhelpful to defendants facing death or incarceration, and defendants also face barriers such as prosecutorial immunity, see 
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that the average black defendant received a twenty-five percent greater prison sentence for a particular crime than did the average white defendant, then courts could simply reduce a black defendant's sentence by twenty-five percent. Because all black defendants could prove this risk, they would all receive the twenty-five percent reduction. No overdeterrence or windfall would result, 10 1 and the compensation would be directly proportional to the imposed risk. 10 2 Courts might therefore be more amenable to granting proportional relief for claims of constitutional risk. Despite the possible benefits of a proportional remedy, this alternative suffers from a number of significant difficulties, the most obvious of which is that it amounts to a race-based remedy. Only defendants of the race at risk would receive reduced sentences, a situation that raises grave political and equal protection concerns.
10 3 Another serious problem is that proportional remedies may undermine public acceptance of court decisions.' 0 4 Observers could find the remedy strange and the message ambiguous: courts would recognize the existence of racial discrimination, but rather than develop doctrines to deter or stop equal protection violations, they would merely cut the baby in half.
B. Structural Injunctions
One might view the mismatch between dismissal and constitutional risk as the predictable result of applying old fixes to new contexts. The constitutional risk perspective addresses systemic, not particularized harm. So although a traditional remedy may be preferable to advocates of judicial restraint, a more systemic remedy may be necessary.
If the goal is systemic change, then structural injunctions seemingly provide a ready answer. If the system creates constitutional risk, then why not require changes in the system? Rather than take the circuitous route of granting windfalls to guilty defendants to deter government discrimination and to eliminate racial disparities, courts could simply mandate an end to inexplicable racial disparities. should employ race-based remedies only as a "last-resort" because "the use of race as a reparational device risks perpetuating the very race-consciousness such a remedy purports to overcome"). 
